Comment
While the US, as a great power, acts as a regional player in the Arctic, Russia as a regional power, becomes a global power in the Arctic.
The Arctic region is unique. As one of the last unexplored regions in the world, where humankind has no or limited access, the Arctic has become an area of international contention. The warming climate, as exhibited by record-breaking temperatures just this week, allows access and cultivation of the region, and with it, the exploration of new shipping routes and resource extraction.
The situation in the Arctic is comparable to the great power rivalry of the last centuries, but nations have been smarter to avoid any conflict in a highly institutionalized environment. Some international rules and regulations, as well as the creation of an intergovernmental forum, the Arctic Council, have averted the immediate danger of an international conflict.
Tenets of the Artic
There are three basic instruments that set the rules of the game. The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) sets the boundaries for littoral nations as to what extent they can exploit and utilize the sea within the so-called Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). UNCLOS also grants Freedom of Navigation (FON) for international shipping through international waters, EEZs, and territorial waters. The Arctic Council serves as a forum for littoral states (US, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia), and geographically surrounding states (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) to communicate and settle any disputes amongst its members. Equally important, the Council guarantees the Arctic to be governed by its littoral states. Third countries and parties, such as China, the EU, or the United Kingdom are permitted only as observer status capacity.
Although these international rules allow for disputes in some geographical areas, or in their interpretation, which probably flare up some time in the future, the Arctic littoral states are content with the existing legal framework.
Why the Arctic Council Works
Russia is the main beneficiary of the legal framework of the Arctic Council. At the moment, Russia is the most active player and utilizes the Arctic to its benefit. The country shares the longest coastline in the Arctic and holds the most territory for exploration. Russian scientists conduct the most research to ensure its claim for an extension of its EEZ in front of the UN. Russia is also keen to use the Council to keep third parties’ interests distant, while pursuing commercial relationships, preserving its upperhand. China, for example, has already claimed interest in the region by declaring itself unilaterally as a “Near Arctic State”, and plans to build a “Polar Silk Road” for Chinese goods shipped to Europe via the Arctic. Russia would likely support these plans, but only with and through Moscow’s consent. The Russian government understands that most of the Arctic littoral states are NATO members (US, Canada, Denmark, Norway) and likely as a result, Moscow has ramped up its security forces in its “Far North”.
Most importantly in this context, Russia uses the Arctic as a means of regaining its stature as a global power. Russian ambitions include the cultivation of the Northern territories, the exploitation of the Arctic resources such as oil, gas, and fish, as well as the establishment of shipping routes. While these objectives are mostly peaceful and potentially beneficial to other littoral states, Russia’s military presence is viewed with skepticism, yet acceptable; as long as it is deemed necessary for safeguarding shipping routes and territorial waters.
Still, the re-establishment of Russia’s great power status in the Arctic is increasing. The upgrade and renovation of its Arctic-based Northern Fleet, the frequency of ballistic missile tests in the Arctic, and the number of strategic bomber flights near NATO borders are concerning for its members. The rearmament of the Russian forces near the Arctic was implemented not later than 2012. Before the start of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014, Russia increased the use of strategic forces in the Arctic region. This is not a new and unnoticed endeavor, but nonetheless NATO members have done little to address or counter this development.
US Policy, Russia and the Arctic
Current US Arctic policy signals that the US Administration has accepted Russia’s regional dominance in the region. However, it is not clear whether US officials have realized Russia’s long-term ambitions. If it is in Washington’s interest to contain Moscow, it needs to form a strategy that takes into consideration three key points.
- The US interest in the Arctic is regional condensed and narrowly focused on Alaska. It is certainly important to protect Alaska against threats. Alaska has a maritime border with Russia across the Bering Strait. US military presence is capable, but limited to border and coastal protection. US nuclear submarines regularly operate in the Bering Sea and the US Air Force has reinforced its interception capabilities against occasional Russian strategic bomber flights. But it is the US Coast Guard serves as the main US military force presence. With respect to the US Coast Guard’s capabilities, at the only branch that operates an ice-breaker, the protection of US territorial waters is not balanced when compared to Russia’s Arctic armament. Most of Russia’s Arctic rearmament military activity, and deployment of forces occurs in the European part of the Arctic, where US presence is sparse.
- There is no NATO presence in the Arctic either. Despite the fact that all Arctic littoral states, but Russia, are NATO members, the littoral states follow mostly individual strategies. Part of the reason is a lack of interest, financial and personnel obligations, and a missing threat perception as potential territorial disputes are mostly resolved. Russia’s global power ambitions are concerning for NATO members in the Arctic, but not so much for NATO itself. Historically, the US contribution to NATO has been both, the supply of materiel and troops, as well as diplomatic leadership. Regarding Arctic security, the provision of materiel and troops are most useful. The 2014 rejuvenation of the North Atlantic based US Navy 2nd Fleet, in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, represents a significant change. Despite its intention, this act has not been sufficient to project NATO’s accession in the Arctic. The 2nd Fleet is not equipped to maintain a permanent presence of US Navy warships in the region. The acquisition of a US Navy ice-breaker fleet, for example, is a necessary requirement to stake a claim. The US, as NATO’s strongest member, needs to prioritize and lead a coordinated NATO Arctic discussion and awareness that leads to a response and implementable policies for the medium term.
- The Arctic is not a priority in the US security strategic framework. As a Russian attack against the US is low, the status of Russia as an adversary to the US remains in place. The US prioritizes the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea, as well as Iran in its security policy and allocates its diplomatic and military resources in these regions. The withdrawal of those resources from other regions, however, leaves a void that Russia is keen to quietly play to its advantage. Wherever the US has withdrawn its attention and presence in the recent past, Russia has proven its capability and willingness to fill those gaps. Russia’s foreign policies in Syria, Libya and Ukraine serve as examples of that strategy.
Current Russian ambitions in the Arctic are for the most part commercial and peaceful. The cultivation of the Northern territory, and the exploitation of resources and waterways are potentially benefitting most littoral states. However, Russia’s longer term and more aggressive objectives that involve its military in the Arctic are concerning for littoral states, NATO and the world. However, much could be achieved at a low cost. The creation of an ice-breaker fleet for the Navy, the revival of NATO’s interest in the North and eventually, a recognition of the Arctic region in the US security strategy will potentially deter Russia from pursuing a more aggressive stance.